Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

28 April 2004

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Implementation of article VI of the NPT, taking into account the conclusions in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 principles and objectives

Report submitted by the Netherlands

Introduction

1. In this paper, the Netherlands will give a substantive report of the steps undertaken by the Netherlands in the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4© of the 1995 Principles and Objectives. As the most recent elaboration of the obligations embodied in article VI and the Principles and Objectives is contained in the 13 steps of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, this report will focus on these practical steps. In doing so the Netherlands will inform the PrepCom of the implementation by the Netherlands of *those* steps related to nuclear disarmament, for which also non-nuclear weapon states bear responsibility. It is clear that only the nuclear weapon states bear a special responsibility for implementing all steps.

Step 1: the CTBT

2. The Netherlands has worked toward entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in two ways: by actively supporting the work of the CTBTO-PrepCom in Vienna in implementing the Treaty's verification mechanism and by promoting signature and/or ratification of the CTBT. The Netherlands belonged to the group of original co-sponsors of the Ministerial Declaration on the early entry-into-force of the CTBT, issued on September 14, 2002 at the Ministerial Part of the 57th United Nations General Assembly. The Netherlands furthermore participated in the efforts undertaken in the framework of the European Union to achieve early entry into force of this treaty through diplomatic demarches in non-signatory and non-ratifying countries. The Netherlands participated actively in the Art. XIV Conference in 2003. The Conference decided, inter alia, to create the function of a Special Representative to further promote the entry into force of the Treaty. Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of The Netherlands was subsequently appointed as Special Representative. The Government of The Netherlands will provide financial assistance to the Special Representative to fulfil his task.

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Step 2: Test moratorium

3. Although strictly speaking a step to be taken by the Nuclear Weapon States, it is clear that pending entry into force of the CTBT, test moratoria gain in importance. That is why for the Netherlands insistence on a test moratorium is part and parcel of our diplomatic efforts promoting the Test Ban Treaty.

Step 3: FMCT-negotiations

4. The Netherlands has supported several initiatives that could provide the basis for a work programme in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), in particular the initiative of the so-called Five Ambassadors, and that subsequently could lead to the immediate commencement of negotiations leading to a treaty to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). The Netherlands will continue to apply maximum flexibility in the discussions on a work program of the CD, which should finally allow these negotiations to really start.

5. In the meantime, the Netherlands has remained active in relation to the issue of fissile material, in order to try to implement the agreement reached at both the 1995 and 2000 NPT-conferences on this important next multilateral step on the road to nuclear disarmament. For this reason, the Netherlands initiated an FMCT-exercise in Geneva of a series of open-ended informal meetings of an informative and educational nature on the issue of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The purpose of this exercise is to better prepare delegations in Geneva for the actual negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on an FMCT. Since the last PrepCom in April 2002, the Netherlands has organised six meetings on various relevant topics: the relevance of an FMCT for nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, the scope of an FMCT, the relation between IAEA-safeguards and an FMCT, and stockpiles of fissile material. Reports of these meetings have been circulated as official documents of the CD. The Netherlands will continue this FMCT-exercise as long as the negotiations have not commenced.

Step 4: Nuclear disarmament in the CD

6. Once the CD has agreed upon a Program of Work, attention should also be given to nuclear disarmament. The proposal to establish a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with this subject was originally made by a group of states including the Netherlands.

Step 5: Irreversibility

7. Irreversibility is important for multilateral and bilateral arms control alike. Although *agreeing* on bilateral nuclear arms reductions is primarily the responsibility of the nuclear weapon states, international stability and security are best served by *irreversible* reductions. It has been a consistent element in the approach of the Netherlands towards nuclear reduction talks to emphasise the importance of irreversibility. The Netherlands therefore welcomes that SORT-Treaty in which reductions of strategic offensive nuclear weapons has been laid down in a legally binding document. This in itself promotes irreversibility. The Netherlands welcomes the entry into force of this treaty.

Step 6: The unequivocal undertaking

8. The Netherlands considers the unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI, as one of the major achievements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. While acknowledging the Nuclear Weapon States for the steps they have taken so far to reduce their nuclear arsenals (both by dismantling nuclear weapons as by destruction of fissile material and closing down production facilities), the Netherlands has been encouraging the Nuclear weapon States to further continue their efforts in this respect.

Step 7: START and the ABM-treaty

9. Strictly speaking, START and the ABM-Treaty are a bilateral issue, but of course it is of interest to the whole NPT-community. The Netherlands believes that in looking at the implementation of this step we should take the changed international circumstances into account. Instead of focussing on the demise of the ABM-Treaty we must look to the future. The Netherlands is encouraged by the new Strategic Framework that has been negotiated between the Russian Federation and the United States, and the prominent place strategic nuclear reductions take therein, building on the START-process. We will continue to argue for measures regarding verification, transparency, predictability and irreversibility to form part of any ensuing agreement.

Step 8: The Trilateral Initiative

10. The Netherlands has been encouraging the Trilateral parties - the Russian Federation, the United States and the IAEA - to conclude and implement the Trilateral Initiative. This Initiative is an important contribution in enhancing confidence and trust, and should be used in full.

Step 9: International stability and undiminished security

11. The implementation of the steps as part of overall step 9 is the main responsibility of the Nuclear Weapon States. Nevertheless, on two elements of these steps - accountability and transparency, and non-strategic nuclear weapons – The Netherlands has always emphasised the importance: in the UN, the CD, and the NPT and during bilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament.

12. The Netherlands has been strongly advocating increasing accountability and transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. At the last NPT-Review Conference in 2000, the Netherlands introduced proposals in this respect, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and Norway. Regarding transparency, according to the original proposals, such measures could include a commitment by the NWS to provide periodically the aggregate numbers of warheads, delivery systems, stocks of fissile material for military purposes in their possession and their nuclear policies. Some of the Nuclear Weapon States have already allowed for a good degree of transparency. It is the sincere hope of the Netherlands that these states will further their efforts in being transparent regarding their nuclear arsenals. The Netherlands would like to call on the other nuclear weapon states to also become more transparent on their nuclear arsenals.

13. But transparency on nuclear issues not only applies to the "haves"; it also applies to the "have-nots". Comprehensive safeguards (INFCIRC/153) constitute a bare minimum. Concluding additional safeguards (INFCIRC/540) with the IAEA is also an important way of being transparent. The Netherlands has done so. We urge all those States that have not yet signed or ratified such an Additional Protocol to do so without delay.

14. We also believe that the reduction of warheads and non-strategic nuclear weapons should take place in a transparent and irreversible way. Increased transparency with regard to tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons could be a first step and would be an important CBM.

15. As party to the NPT and as a member of NATO, we feel a special responsibility in relation to the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has significantly reduced the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal. What remains deployed in Europe is only a very small amount of the original numbers that were there 10 or more years ago. More than 80 percent of these weapons were actually eliminated. Their readiness is presently measured in weeks and months rather than in hours and days. The purpose of NATO's remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons is fundamentally political. Within NATO, a process has started between the Alliance and the Russian Federation to give appropriate attention to the question of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The dialogue, which is now starting will hopefully lead to measures that will promote mutual confidence, transparency and stability.

16. The Netherlands has, together with Belgium and Norway submitted a document (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.17) at the 2nd PrepCom of the NPT which is meant to support and assist the Chairs of the 3rd PrepCom session and ultimately of the 2005 RevCon, in their efforts to reach consensus language on a number of relevant issues. Some countries concerned were already invited to make additional comments and further develop substantive elements of the document, as orally stated by the authors at the 2nd PrepCom session. The initiators welcome other interested parties to contribute to the document and/or cosponsor the document at this (3rd) PrepCom.

Step 11: general and complete disarmament

17. The Netherlands continues to be active on almost all non-nuclear arms control and disarmament issues: biological weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, landmines, explosive remnants of war and small arms and light weapons.

Step 12: reporting

18. This report constitutes the fulfilment of the Netherlands with this obligation.

Step 13: development of verification

19. On the development of verification capabilities to assure "compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world", as step 13 puts it, the Netherlands participated in various seminars and discussions.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Havana Declaration

Submitted by Cuba

We, the Member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), on the occasion of the Eighteenth Regular Session of the General Conference, held in Havana, Cuba, on November 5 and 6, 2003,

Reaffirm that the mere existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the survival of humanity. We therefore believe in the need to advance toward the primary objective of nuclear disarmament and attainment of the comprehensive elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction from the face of the Earth as soon as possible.

Express our conviction that achieving the objective of eliminating and prohibiting nuclear weapons forever requires firm political will on the part of all States, particularly those States possessing nuclear weapons.

Underscore that any assumption by nuclear-weapon States concerning unspecified possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

Express our concern regarding the genuine possibility that new approaches in which a wider role is given to nuclear weapons as part of security strategies can lead to the development of new types of nuclear weapons and arguments in favor of their use.

Highlight the importance of multilateral diplomacy in the subject of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament and associated issues of international security. In this context, we recognize the important role the United Nations plays in the subject of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, and we reiterate our commitment to adopting measures to strengthen that role.

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In this context, we:

Reiterate our satisfaction that, following the ratification by the Republic of Cuba, the Zone of Application established in conformity with the Treaty of Tlatelolco is fully in force and, thereby, consolidates the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region.

Reaffirm that the consolidation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco is an important contribution of the region to international peace, security and stability and is a clear demonstration of the firm commitment of Latin America and the Caribbean to the cause of comprehensive and verifiable nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Emphasize the important role played by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), and consequently are committed to strengthening it as an appropriate legal and political forum to ensure unqualified respect for the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to promote cooperation and coordination mechanisms with related international agencies linked to disarmament, as well as with other nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Consequently, as Member States of OPANAL, we assume a commitment to:

Promote the convening of a Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, to be held as soon as possible, in order to support the common objectives established in these treaties and examine possible forms and means of cooperation.

Appeal to the States possessing nuclear weapons to provide full guarantees to all the States members of nuclear-weapon-free zones that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

Promote the strengthening of the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by requesting a review of the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear powers Parties to Protocols I and II for possible withdrawal or modification.

Strengthen national nuclear control and verification systems to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

Continue working in the sphere of competent international agencies to strengthen and supplement current international laws in the field of security and liability measures that are applicable to the transporting of radioactive material and hazardous wastes that will contribute to preventing the radioactive contamination of the marine environment in the Treaty's Zone of Application.

Havana, November 6, 2003

(Adopted by acclamation at the 102nd Session
held on November 6, 2003)

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Hungary

1. The Republic of Hungary recognizes the importance of reporting for the strengthened review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Step 12 of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference remains to be the basis for continued reporting. However, Hungary believes that, in order to assure a high number of submissions, a more general and comprehensive approach could prove to be more effective than the one outlined in Step 12. The Hungarian implementation report submitted to the second session of the Preparatory Committee in 2003 (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/2) was prepared with this goal in mind and Hungary's report to the third session follows a similar pattern, reporting on activities related not only to Article VI of the Treaty or to regional issues.

2. Hungary becomes a full-fledged member of the European Union on 1 May 2004. As an acceding country, Hungary took part in the work leading up to the adoption of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2003. Hungary fully subscribes to the principles and objectives enshrined in the Strategy. The Strategy states that "the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be preserved in its integrity", a goal that Hungary shares, in view of the numerous challenges that the NPT-regime has to face.

3. In light of the unprecedented challenges to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, Hungary studies carefully the new initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle in a multilateral and non-discriminatory framework. Hungary looks forward to a substantive and productive discussion of these issues at the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2005 Review Conference.

4. The recent revelation of a global black market network, which provided nuclear technology, materials, and equipment to States ready to pay for them, is cause for deep concern for the whole international community. It highlights the importance of strict and effective export control measures

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and of proposals to reinforce existing instruments and practices. Hungary supports all useful initiatives to tackle this serious challenge. In this context, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by U.S. President George W. Bush in Krakow on 31 May 2003, is an important contribution. The initiative's main goal is to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials and technologies, through the interdiction of weapons-related air or sea cargo. Hungary has lent full political support to this initiative since its launching. Hungarian experts participate regularly in interdiction exercises organized in the PSI framework (e.g. in Germany, Italy and Poland). Hungary has taken stock of the available administrative structure and the legislative instruments necessary for Hungary's participation in the co-operation activities within the PSI framework.

5. Hungary considers the IAEA safeguard system as an indispensable mechanism to verify compliance with the NPT and to ensure nuclear transparency. Such a system promotes confidence essential for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Hungary believes that the Model Additional Protoeol, together with a comprehensive safeguard agreement, now represents the verification standard and lends its full support to making the Additional Protocol mandatory under Article III of the Treaty. Such a decision should be taken at the 2005 Review Conference.

6. Hungary attaches great importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The efforts to achieve the Treaty's entry into force must be upheld. Hungary participated at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2003, which adopted a Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the CTBT. In implementing these measures and also in furthering the goals of the Treaty, many important and challenging tasks remain to be tackled by States parties to the CTBT and by the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat. Hungary, also in its capacity as Chair of Working Group A of the Preparatory Commission, will continue to do its utmost to bring about the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT.

7. Disarmament, as stipulated in Article VI of the Treaty and in various commitments made in 1995 and 2000, remains a pivotal goal of the NPT-process. In this context, Hungary welcomes the entry into force of the Moscow Treaty on 1 June 2003.

8. Hungary continues to support the efforts to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The Conference on Disarmament (CD), the only multilateral negotiating body for disarmament affairs at the disposal of the international community, remains to be the right instance for such negotiations. Hungary will support initiatives whose aim is to find a way out of the current deadlock situation, and to induce Member States to take up work on the substantive issues at hand, including the FMCT and nuclear disarmament. The current informal discussions on the CD's agenda items could lead to a more positive climate conducive for a consensus on a program of work.

9. Hungary co-sponsored a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education and training at the second session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/ PC.II/WP.18). Education and training should receive more attention in the international community's efforts to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations. Hungary therefore decided to

again co-sponsor a working paper on this subject to be submitted to the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee.

10. The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the United Nations in New York, together with the Monterey Institute of International Studies, organized an international workshop entitled "Towards 2005: Problems, Progress and Prospects". The workshop took place at the Hungarian Mission in New York on 25 October 2003. Its main goal was to examine the present status of the NPT review process and to assess the possibilities for the future. The workshop provided a forum for dialogue between government officials and non-governmental organizations' representatives, including those of academic and research institutions. Almost 80 participants discussed the issues at hand. There was consensus that the 2005 Review Conference will have to be forward-looking and will have to provide avenues for the reconciliation of existing political differences.

11. Hungary remains fully committed to the NPT, wholeheartedly supporting its strengthened review process. Hungary will, in the spirit of effective multilateralism, actively participate in the proceedings of the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Report presented by the Syrian Arab Republic at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with a view to the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty

New York, 26 April-7 May 2004

The Syrian Arab Republic was one of the first States in the Middle East to sign, in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It did so out of the conviction that the possession by any State in the Middle East of such devastating weapons would pose a threat to the region and be a source of great anxiety not only to the peoples of the region but to the countries of the entire world.

Syria has also signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It has committed itself and remains committed to all international requirements in that area and has submitted its facilities to yearly international inspections from its signing of that international agreement in 1992 to the present, owing to its conviction regarding the need to establish, in the Middle East, a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and above all nuclear weapons. That conviction is shared by all Arab States, all of which have become parties to the NPT.

On the basis of that firm belief the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Security Council, in the latter half of April 2003, an initiative aimed at ridding the Middle East region of weapons of mass destruction that was supported by all the Arab States. Syria declared before the international community that it would participate with its Arab sister States and indeed all the countries of the world in transforming the Middle East region into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical or biological.

Syria has long been a forerunner, whether in the United Nations or in the League of Arab States, in the appeal to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. It has striven tirelessly and effectively for the creation of such a zone. It has worked [illegible]siduously, through

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the annual regular sessions of the IAEA General Conference, for the adoption of a resolution for the application of the Agency's safeguards in the Middle East, requesting all parties directly concerned to consider in earnest the adoption of suitable practical measures for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. It has invited the countries concerned to accede to the international non-proliferation regimes, including the NPT, as a means of completing their contribution towards a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (document GC(46)/16). Israel, however, has not responded to that invitation, but rather insists on continuing to be the sole country in the region to remain outside the international system, refusing to accede to any international call emanating from the United Nations, whether the General Assembly or the Security Council. It will be recalled that Israel is the only country in the region that has refused to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It has also refused to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement and to submit all its nuclear activities to the IAEA international inspection system and in fact exhibits the utmost disdain for the relevant international resolutions.

The Syrian Arab Republic was the first country, in 1986, to request IAEA to include in the agenda of the regular sessions of its General Conference an item entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat", based on an information note issued as document GC(XXX)/778, of 10 June 1986. The request was approved and the item remained on the agenda until 1992, at which time the President of the General Conference issued a presidential statement in which he explained that in order to maintain the peace process at that time, the item would be dropped. To date, however, even after the peace process came to a halt, the General Conference has consistently failed to adopt a resolution concerning the "Israeli nuclear threat", confining itself instead to the issuance of presidential statements that do not exert any pressure on Israel or make it comply with any international requirements. This is a matter of great concern in the region, owing to the enormous inequality in the balance of power stemming from Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and thus posing a threat to regional and international peace and security.

As for the resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the 2000 Review Conference succeeded in reaffirming that it would remain in force until its goals and objectives were achieved and that it was one of the main components of the success of the 1995 Conference. This is an important achievement of the Arab Group, which engaged in effective participation at the time and worked towards the development of a unified position on the matter. The Syrian Arab Republic, which clearly expressed its opinion on this point at the time, considers that the reasons that led to the adoption of the resolution are still valid today. Its purpose was to garner the support of most of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties for a resolution to extend the Treaty indefinitely without a vote, with the proviso that the complaints of those States should be examined subsequently — something that brooks no further delay. Those States relied on the good faith of the nuclear-weapon States in honouring their commitments, which were totally ignored thereafter. Even the study of the shortcomings of the Treaty, with a view to filling in the gaps about which States parties complained, has been ignored. Let us mention here that at every one of the Preparatory Committee's meetings the United States of America was intent on breaching and disavowing that covenant, with no other justification for its behaviour than to consecrate the

principle of double standards and to keep Israel out of the Treaty and preserve its nuclear arsenal.

Syria considers it essential that the mechanism relating to concerns over the current situation in the region, which the Secretary-General of the United Nations is requested to prepare pursuant to the final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, should reflect current events that are ablaze in the region. Syria reaffirms that it is essential for that mechanism to exert international pressure to compel Israel to accede to the wishes of the international community, implement the resolutions of international legitimacy and to put an end to its colonialist aspirations consisting in the continued occupation of land belonging to three Arab States, namely Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, and to the development of its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, Syria stresses the need for that demand to be international, not merely Arab or regional, as an essential factor in ensuring the credibility and globality of the NPT and in realizing the principle of a just balance by avoiding a policy of double standards.

Syria and the other Arab States have continued to evince good faith for a long time, i.e., since the first days of the Treaty, relying on the good faith of the nuclear-weapon States. However, the close ties between the United States of America and Israel have brought the region to the situation of open violation of international legitimacy that we now see before us. In this way Israel has been assisted since its inception in the pursuit of its policy of aggression, continuing to this day to occupy part of Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian territories and thereby threatening the peace and stability of the entire region.

Finally, Syria considers that in order to achieve the desired transparency, it is imperative first of all to make the NPT global through the exertion of pressure on Israel by the international community, in earnest and without partiality or discrimination, to abide by international commitments and resolutions and accede to the NPT as a major step towards making the Middle East region a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, for the matter cannot be resolved by half-solutions. The appeal for making the Middle East such a zone must not be made at the Arab or regional level only; it requires the adoption of serious international resolutions.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Report submitted by Portugal on the implementation of article VI of the NPT and of paragraph 4 (c) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, produced by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

Portugal views regular reporting on the implementation of article VI of the NPT and of paragraph 4 (c) of the Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' produced by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, as one of the fundamental elements of a genuinely strengthened review process. Regular reporting helps to create a general culture of transparency and helps to promote increased confidence in the overall NPT regime, thus contributing to transparency, confidence-building and the irreversibility of commitments made in the area of disarmament by States parties to the Treaty.

Portugal therefore welcomes the consensus reached in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference on the issue of regular reporting by all States parties, and wishes to show its commitment to the above-mentioned principles by presenting its report on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and of paragraph 4 (c) of the Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', produced by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

1. Portugal does not possess any weapons of mass destruction. Portugal has been a State party to the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) since 13 January 1993, to the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) since 29 June 1972 and to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 15 December 1977. Portugal has always called, in multilateral and bilateral settings, especially as a member of NATO and the European Union (EU), for the universal adherence to all these regimes.

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2. Portugal sees the NPT as the cornerstone of all efforts in nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that sense, the NPT is a balanced treaty that reflects the need to see gradual nuclear disarmament in the wider context of irreversible and verifiable global disarmament. Portugal is committed to the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty and undertakes focussed diplomatic efforts, together with its allies and partners, to achieve that goal.

3. Portugal believes in the need for prudent nuclear disarmament, which is not an end in itself and cannot be pursued in isolation. Nuclear disarmament must be pursued under international control, while ensuring global stability, security and peace. In this context, Portugal welcomes the significant reduction of nuclear arsenals in Europe since the end of the Cold War.

4. Portugal signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 26 June 2000. Portugal strongly supports the early entry into force of the CTBT and has been calling, both in its bilateral contacts and in all multilateral settings, for as many signatures and ratifications as possible. Portugal takes part in the International Monitoring System with three monitoring stations that are in the process of being settled in the Azores (one infrasound monitoring station, one hydroacoustics monitoring station and one radionucloide monitoring station). Furthermore, Portugal has been taking part in Facilitation Conferences (in the framework of Article XIV of the CTBT) for the entry into force of the Treaty, and has been actively engaged in several other political initiatives in support of the CTBT under UN auspices, or in unison with other EU members.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Report on steps taken to promote the achievement of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free from nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction, and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Sweden

In the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the section entitled "Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States", paragraph 16 on "Regional Issues", subparagraph 7, it is stated that:

"The Conference requests all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone (i.e. a Middle East zone free from nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction, *our remark*) and the realisation of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East."

Sweden would hereby like to communicate the following information regarding the realisation of the goals and objectives of the Resolution.

1. Endorses aims and objectives of Middle East peace process and recognises that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

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Sweden supports negotiations for a just, enduring and comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and the principles derived from successive agreements between the parties. Sweden is strongly committed to the need for a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This goal could be promoted in several ways, for example, by making full use of the confidence-building measures that exist within the framework of the EU Mediterranean co-operation (the Barcelona Process) and by establishing mechanisms for transparent and reliable verification in order to destroy the weapons of mass destruction in the region.

2. Calls on the remaining State not party to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards.

Sweden continues to emphasise the importance of universal accession and adherence to the NPT. We call upon Israel to sign and ratify the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

3. Notes the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded facilities and urges those countries that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope IAEA safeguards.

Sweden remains concerned with the existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in the region. We urge all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols with the IAEA.

4. Reaffirms importance of the early realisation of universal adherence to the NPT, and calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the NPT as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

See answer under paragraph 2 and 3.

5. Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate fora to make progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.

Sweden is strongly committed to the establishment of zones free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Sweden voted in favour of resolution 58/34 entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, which was adopted by the 58th United Nations General Assembly.

While welcoming Libya's decision to end its nuclear weapons programme and while acknowledging that Libya's decision could contribute to a process towards the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, Sweden is concerned with the fact that Libya has been in breach of its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The signature of the Additional Protocol by Iran and its voluntary suspension of all enrichment-related activities is welcome step. However, a number of questions surrounding Iran's nuclear programme remain outstanding. Iran must continue to co-operate fully with the IAEA in order to resolve them. Regarding Iraq, at present, the IAEA is the sole organisation, with legal powers derived from the NPT and the United Nations Security Council resolutions, to verify Iraq's nuclear disarmament. Inspections still need to be completed in order to resolve remaining questions about Iraq's nuclear programme. In regard to other weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, UNMOVIC is the sole organisation, with legal powers derived from the United Nations Security Council resolutions, to verify Iraq's disarmament.

6. Call upon all States parties to the NPT, and in particular the nuclear-weapons States, to extend co-operation and support efforts towards the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

Sweden continues to support the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Report submitted by Sweden

Introduction

As stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, the Conference agreed on: "Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

Sweden would hereby like to submit her report to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Since the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2002, Sweden has actively participated in the work on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This has been done, for example, through the European Union, together with the other states in the New Agenda Coalition, and through the Five Ambassadors' initiative in the Conference on Disarmament.

Disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a cornerstone in Swedish foreign policy and Sweden is a staunch supporter of efforts aimed at advancing progress in this field. In a newspaper article on 27 January 2004, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Ms. Laila Freivalds, together with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Finland, Mr. Giorgios Papandreou and Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, gave their views on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and on the NPT. They urged the three states currently outside the NPT regime – India, Israel and Pakistan - to unconditionally join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon state as soon as possible. They also called for the implementation of the

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13 practical steps agreed by all NPT states in 2000, including the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. They argued that particular attention should be devoted to the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons and voiced concern with the possible development of a new generation of nuclear weapons, and with any plans to increase the role of nuclear weapons in military planning. The ministers furthermore emphasised the importance of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

In an address given at the Conference on Disarmament on 16 February 2004, Foreign Minister Freivalds reiterated the vital importance of the IAEA Additional Protocols as they provide the IAEA with the necessary enhanced means and authority to verify that states comply with their non-proliferation commitments. She also expressed regret at the continued deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament.

At the 58th UN General Assembly, Sweden, together with the other states in the New Agenda Coalition, presented two resolutions entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" (58/51) and "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons" (58/50). The first resolution emphasised, among other things, the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and the implementation of the 13 practical steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. The second resolution highlighted the need for progress with regard to reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Both resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly.

Sweden supported, at the 58th UNGA, a number of resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, for instance the resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (58/34), on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (58/68), on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia (58/518), on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (58/49), on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (58/30), on the Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (58/31) and on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (58/46).

Sweden has also been active in trying to strengthen the common policy of the European Union in order to better address the threats posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and more actively pursue disarmament and non-proliferation of these weapons. The EU Heads of State and Government adopted in December 2003 a strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and Sweden is committed to its effective implementation.

To further address the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction the Swedish government has established an independent international Commission on these weapons. The Commission will present its report, including recommendations on disarmament and non-proliferation measures, to the Swedish Government and the Secretary General of the United Nations by 2005/2006.

Implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" included in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Step 1: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Sweden ratified the CTBT on 2 December 1998. Sweden has worked for the early entry into force of the Treaty bilaterally and through the European Union. Sweden has continuously supported the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna and its efforts to establish the international monitoring system for the verification of the Treaty. Sweden has promoted signatures and ratifications of the Treaty through demarches made by the European Union to a number of states. Sweden supported the resolution (58/71) entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty" adopted by the 58th United Nations General Assembly, which called for measures to enable the Treaty to enter into force. Sweden supports the Article XIV Conferences as important instruments contributing to the early entry into force of the CTBT. Sweden welcomes the results of the third Article XIV Conference in September 2003 and supports the adoption of the final declaration on the twelve specific and practical measures to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty.

Step 2: A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty

Sweden has continuously supported the upholding of a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions by the nuclear weapon states a pending the entry into force of the CTBT.

Step 3: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Co-ordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The CD is urged to agree on a programme of work, which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

It is of great concern to Sweden that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to agree on a programme of work since 1998 and, as a consequence, that negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices have not yet commenced. Sweden believes that it is of paramount importance that the members of the CD agree on a programme of work as soon as possible. Sweden has actively participated in conferences, workshops and seminars on the FMCT-issue, as well as on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Sweden will participate actively in the informal meetings of the CD in the spring of 2004 on, among other subjects, nuclear disarmament, FMCT and PAROS. Sweden supported the decision (58/57) on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which was adopted by the 58th United Nations General Assembly.

Step 4: The necessity of establishing in the CD an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The CD is urged to agree on a programme of work, which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

Sweden supports the establishment of a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament. Pending an agreement on a programme of work, Sweden will participate actively in the informal meetings of the CD in the spring of 2004 on nuclear disarmament, and use these meetings as a starting point for the work on nuclear disarmament in the CD.

Step 5: The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

Irreversibility is a fundamental principle for nuclear disarmament. Only irreversible reductions can assure that re-deployment of nuclear weapons does not occur. Sweden continues to stress that the principle of irreversibility should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control measures, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

Step 6: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to the nuclear disarmament, to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI.

Sweden, unilaterally and together with the states in the New Agenda Coalition, continues to press for states to live up to their commitments regarding the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The unequivocal undertaking that the nuclear-weapons states committed themselves to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference is yet to be fulfilled.

Step 7: The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

Sweden notes the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the abrogation of START II, the withering away of START III, and the conclusion in 2002 of the Moscow Treaty on strategic offensive reductions. The Moscow Treaty represents a positive first step, but the Treaty has to be made verifiable, irreversible and transparent, and should also address non-operational warheads, in order to be an effective nuclear disarmament measure. Reductions in the numbers of deployed warheads are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.

Step 8: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Sweden supports the initiative. It should be applied in the context of disarmament undertakings.

Step 9: Steps by all nuclear weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;

- Further efforts by the nuclear weapon states to reduce their arsenals unilaterally;
- Increased transparency by the nuclear weapon states with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

Sweden fully supports these steps and continues to press for advancements in their implementation.

In particular, Sweden continues to press for progress regarding reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Sweden believes that it is essential that non-strategic nuclear weapons be included in international arms control and disarmament efforts. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are a global concern. Against this background, Sweden together with the other states in the New Agenda Coalition, have presented resolutions on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which were adopted by the 57th and 58th United Nations General Assembly. At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Sweden together with Austria and Mexico, submitted a working paper on non-strategic nuclear weapons. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee, Sweden together with Austria and the Ukraine will present a second working paper on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Sweden will continue to work on this issue in view of the upcoming NPT Review Conference.

Furthermore, steps to increase transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI serve as a confidence building measure and should be strongly supported. The principle of transparency should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control efforts, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

It is also of particular importance that nuclear weapon states diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, do not increase the number or types of nuclear weapons deployed, and do not develop new types of nuclear weapons or rationalisations for their use.

Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

Sweden urges those nuclear weapons states that have not yet done so to conclude such arrangements.

Step 11: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Sweden takes an active part in the work on disarmament of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as conventional weapons. We refer here to the relevant treaties and instruments that deal with these types of weapons.

Step 12: Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

Sweden believes that reports on the implementation of the article and paragraph mentioned above enhances transparency and builds confidence and therefore should be encouraged. Sweden submitted reports to the first, second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Step 13: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Sweden continues to give strong support to the IAEA and a system of strengthened safeguards. The Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements represents the new verification standard for NPT safeguards. Sweden therefore continues to urge all states to conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols. Sweden is of the view that the 2005 Review Conference should take the decision that the Additional Protocol is mandatory under article III of the NPT.